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SilentAir Group Hijacks Asian Telecom Networks to Intercept SMS Codes

A telecom security firm says a state-level actor used compromised operator equipment in at least six Asian countries, mostly targeting Taiwan.

A Stockholm-based telecom security company has named a hacking group SilentAir and says it used compromised equipment inside mobile operators in at least six Asian countries to divert calls and text messages, including the one-time codes used for two-factor login. The company assessed with high confidence that SilentAir is a state-level actor and linked it to China only with low confidence. It says the group has been disrupted for now but could return.

How the interception worked

Operators use the SS7 and Diameter signalling systems, which cross the international IPX network. SilentAir sent the target's home network a location-update message claiming that the hacked equipment was serving the target's phone. If the home network accepted it, calls and texts were diverted to the attackers. For some targets, two-factor codes were intercepted right after the diversion. The report gives no similar evidence for voice calls and does not say whether any account was taken over.

Interception made up 18.3 per cent of SilentAir's observed attacks, compared with 2.1 per cent for a typical surveillance company in the firm's earlier research. Targets included political and government figures, mostly in Taiwan, and networks elsewhere in Southeast and East Asia, and at times in East Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Attacks came in bursts, from one or a few subscribers to several thousand over a month, with gaps of months between them. The report does not name the countries, the operators or the targets.

Attribution and detection

The group sent silent text messages at large scale, mainly to Taiwan subscribers, and the activity followed a working day in the UTC+8 time zone, slowing at weekends and around Chinese holidays; it did not target Chinese networks. The firm considered a link to a group known as Liminal Panda and called it possible and unconfirmed, noting differences in behaviour and a much better operational security. It found traces of unauthorised access inside one operator but could not analyse the malware.

The firm advises operators to deploy firewalls on the GTP signalling traffic that share data with the SS7 and Diameter firewalls, to treat the whole IPX network as untrusted, to detect signalling threats inside their own networks and to connect signalling security with wider IT security. It gives no advice for individuals. The report does not mention India, and Southeast Asia appears only as a region where networks and targets were located.

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